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ABSTRACT
A survey investigation of the value of an external audit was undertaken in the summer of 2004 
that was based primarily on the same questions that were used in a similar survey completed in 
1984.  Because of changes in auditing and the new regulatory structure, the question arose about 
the perception of such changes among the sample from the Fortune 500 used in the survey.  Four
additional questions were added to those used in the original survey that sought opinions related 
to the implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.
Among the key conclusions were these:
1. There has persisted the opinion that the external audit does add value.  The percentage in 
2004 responding “yes” was 92.5; in 1984, the percentage was 95.
2. Key value of an audit in 2004 was “we believe the audit is required for credibility of our 
financial statements.” (41.2 percent); key value in 1984 was “external audit imposes 
discipline on our financial reporting process.” (74.0 percent)
The additional questions related to Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 were in line with comments in 
the business press.  The majority of respondents indicated uncertainty about the value and impact 
of the Act’s new structure.
The Design of the Survey 
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INTRODUCTION
On April 30,1984 a partner in one of the Big-8 accounting firms, during a luncheon speech to 
academic accountants, noted, that the audit “added no value.”  That conclusion did not seem 
correct and led to a survey designed to inquire of U. S. companies about the value of an audit.  
The response to that survey revealed that 95 percent checked that they would have an external 
audit even if not required by the Securities and Exchange Commission.  
There have been dramatic changes in the intervening 20 years since that survey of the value of an 
audit.  With the cluster of alleged audit failures in such entities as Waste Management, Sunbeam, 
Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, HealthSouth, and Adelphia, the U. S. government undertook to 
introduce changes in both rule making and oversight through the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.  
Furthermore, efforts, beginning in the final years of the last century to assure quality corporate 
governance, may have been influential both to boards of directors and to top management.
The question of the 2004 survey was:  “How valuable is the audit perceived to be today?”  This 
is the same question that guided the earlier survey investigation.  In the following segments of 
this discussion, these topics will be presented:  1.  The design of the survey; 2.  Sample selection; 
3.  Responses of sample in 2004 compared with 1984; 4. Respondents and to whom they report; 
5.  Value of the external audit; 6.  Relative quality of internal and external audit staffs; 7.  Extent 
of participation in external audit by internal auditors; 8.  Alternatives to an external audit; 
9. View of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002;  and 10.  Some summary comments. 
1.  THE DESIGN OF THE SURVEY
The straightforward questionnaire that was used in 1984 was again the basis of the questionnaire 
in the 2004 survey.   However, an additional three questions were added that dealt with opinions 
about the implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.    
As in the case of the original survey, the first question listed was:  “Would you have an annual 
audit by a public accounting firm if it were not required by the Securities and Exchange Act of 
1934?”  The first alternative listed was “no.” A letter, together with the questionnaire, was 
addressed directly to the Chief Executive Officer of the randomly selected companies.  The letter 
included a request to “forward the questionnaire to one of your staff, who can best report the 
opinion of your top executives as a group.”
2.  SAMPLE SELECTION
In selecting the sample of publicly-owned companies, the primary assumption guiding the choice 
of Fortune 500 companies as the population for sample selection was:
Of all companies, the largest publicly-owned companies were most likely 
to have on staff the expertise both in accounting and auditing and might believe
that an external audit was redundant.
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A sample of 280 companies was selected at random from the Fortune April 5, 2004 listing of the 
largest U. S. corporations.  Companies were assured of anonymity, with no questions asked that 
would reveal the company responding.   
3. RESPONSES OF SAMPLE IN 2004 COMPARED WITH 1984
Of the 280 letters/questionnaires mailed, one was returned undelivered.  Another seven recipients
wrote letters indicating that they did not participate in survey studies.  As one noted, which was 
typical of these responses:
Although this appears to be a valuable, timely study, I’m afraid we are unable
to take part.  Due to the inordinate number of such requests we receive, we 
have decided to decline all of them in order to devote our resources to managing 
our business affairs.
Responses were received from 56 companies of the 272 that were assumed to have reached the 
recipients (21.6 percent).  The response to the 1984 survey was 40 percent.  Additionally, in the 
1984 survey, there were 11 CEOs who returned the questionnaire with a letter noting how 
important the external audit was to them personally since they wanted evidence that their 
financial accounting system was functioning properly.  These 11 letters, of course, identified the 
companies.  They did not appear to care about anonymity!
In contrast, the 2004 questionnaire did not elicit a single letter from any officer in the company.  
Furthermore, there were far fewer comments.  There is no basis for drawing conclusions, beyond 
the obvious that interest in broad communication with two academics was at best far more 
indifferent in 2004 than it had been in 1984.
4.  RESPONDENTS AND TO WHOM THEY REPORT
There was a range of titles among the respondents.  Table 1 lists the titles of the respondents and 
Table 2 lists the title of the persons to whom respondents reported. Without more information 
about organizational structure in each company, it is not possible to assume that the same title is 
at the same level in different companies.  The titles were summarized as provided, with no 
interpretation of level identified.
As noted in Table 1, controllers (33.9 percent) and chief accounting officials (28.5 percent) were 
the most common respondents. Over half (51.8 percent) of respondents report to the chief 
financial officer, while 19 report to the chief executive officer (35.2 percent) as shown in Table 
2. While nine respondents were internal auditors, only one identified reporting to the audit 
committee of the board of directors.  
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Table 1
Titles of Respondents of the Questionnaire
N = 56
         Frequency        Percentage
Chief Executive Officer (CEO) 2 3.6
Chief Financial Officer (CFO) 10 17.9
Controller 19 33.9
Chief Accounting Officer or 
Vice President of Financial Reporting 16 28.5
Internal Auditor 9 16.1
Totals 56 100.0
Table 2
Titles of Persons to Whom Respondents Report
N = 54*
                                                                                          Frequency     Percentage
Chief Executive Officer (CEO)                                                  19                  35.2
Chief Financial Officer (CFO)                                                   28                   51.8
Executive VP and CFO                                                              2                     3.7
Controller                                                                                    2                    3.7
General Auditor                                                                          2                     3.7
Audit Committee (director of internal audit)                                1  1.9
                                                       Totals                                54                 100.0
* The two CEOs who responded did not list anyone to whom they reported.
5.  VALUE OF AN EXTERNAL AUDIT
In the 2004 survey there was again, as in 1984, an overwhelming “yes” response to the question:  
“Would you have an annual audit by a public accounting firm if it were not required by the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934?”
Of the 56 respondents, 52 checked “yes”; only 4 checked “no.”  This “yes” response in 2004 
(92.9 percent) is not materially different from the 95 percent who responded to the 1984 survey.  
Three of the four who checked “no” in Question 2 checked:  “We don’t believe the credibility 
provided by the outside audit is needed by users of our financial statements.” The fourth “no” 
respondent checked:  “We think our internal auditors provide us with sufficient financial audits.”
Value of an External Audit Revisited
4
The 52 who chose “yes” to the question of undergoing an external audit even if not required by 
the SEC, were asked to check the “most important reason” for the value of an audit in the 2004 
survey.  Their responses are shown in Table 3.  The respondents have accepted the credibility 
value, with 21 (41.2 percent of the 51 respondents) noting this value. The second most frequently
stated reason:  “An external audit imposes discipline on our financial reporting process” was checked 
by 19 (37.3 percent of respondents).  In the 1984 survey, the most frequently stated reason was: 
“imposition of discipline,” with 74 percent of the respondents noting this reason.  In the 1984 
survey, 68 percent noted the reason that is listed first in the 2004 survey.  Comparisons are not 
relevant since, in 1984, respondents checked as many reasons as they believed were important, 
rather than only the “most important reason” as requested in 2004.  
Table 3
The Value of an External Audit
(N = 51*)
Reason Frequency Percentage
We believe that an external audit is required
     for credibility of our financial statements. 21** 41.2
An external audit imposes discipline on our 
     financial reporting process 19** 37.3
Our banks require external audits. 7 13.7
An external audit encourages adherence to GAAP. 4 7.8
An external audits results in valuable 
recommendations for our total operations.  2 3.9
An external audit helps us maintain high quality
     among our internal audit staff.   1   1.9
*Only 51 of the 52 who checked “yes” responded to this question.
**Three respondents checked both reasons.
6.  RELATIVE QUALITY OF INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL AUDIT STAFFS
Fewer than half of the respondents in the 2004 survey (26, 46.4 percent) believed that the quality 
of their internal audit staff was approximately of the same quality as that of the external audit 
staff.  The responses are shown in Table 4.  However, as noted, approximately 40 percent (22, 
39.3 percent) judged the external auditors to be of higher quality than their own internal audit 
staffs.  In the 1984 survey, 63.8 percent felt the two staffs were approximately of the same 
quality, while 25.7 percent judged the external auditors to be of higher quality than their internal 
audit staffs.
Extent of Participation in External Audit by Internal Auditors 
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Approximately 10 percent of the respondents believed that their internal audit staffs were superior 
to the external auditors.  In the 1984 survey, 9.5 percent of the respondents also believed that 
their internal auditors were superior to the external auditors.  In the 2004 survey, two 
respondents who believed that the external auditors were superior in quality noted that “we are 
catching up with the quality of external auditors.”
Table 4
Perceptions of Quality of External and Internal Auditing Staffs
(N = 56)
Perception Frequency Percentages
The two staffs are approximately of the same quality 26 46.4
We would judge the external auditors to be of higher
     quality than our audit staff. 22 39.3
We would judge our internal auditors to be of higher
quality than the external audit staff.   6 10.7
The two staffs have different skill sets (an added
response) 2 3.6
Total 56 100.0
7. EXTENT OF PARTICIPATION IN EXTERNAL AUDIT BY INTERNAL AUDITORS
Internal auditors participate in external audits.  That is the perception of the respondents in the 
2004 survey.  As noted in Table 5, while 53.6 percent participated no more than 10 percent, there 
were 25 percent of the respondents who indicated that between 11 and 20 percent of the staff’s 
time during the period of the audit was spent in assisting external auditors.   However, almost 20 
percent indicate that there was no participation of their audit staff as assistants to the external 
auditors. 
When these percentages are compared to the responses of 1984, it is interesting to note several 
significant differences.  In 1984, 5.7 percent of the respondents indicated zero participation and,
as noted in the preceding paragraph, the 2004 survey revealed that 20 percent had zero 
participation.  If the responses for “no more than 10 percent” and between 11 percent and 20 
percent” are added together, the result for 1984 is 77.1 percent; for 2004, 78.6 percent.  
However, in 1984, there was a 40.0 percent for “no more than 10 percent” and a 37.1 percent for 
“between 11 and 20 percent.”  Overall, the perception is that internal auditors are providing less 
assistance than was the case 20 years earlier.
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Table 5
INTERNAL AUDITORS’ PARTICIPATION IN EXTERNAL AUDITS
(N = 56)
Extent of Participation Frequency Percentage
Zero percent 11 19.6
Some time, but no more than 10 percent 30 53.6
Between 11 and 20 percent 14 25.0
Approximately 35 percent (added) 1 1.8
Total 56 100.0
8.  ALTERNATIVES TO AN EXTERNAL AUDIT
An open-ended question was asked: “Is there an alternative to the annual audit by an outside 
accounting firm that you think should be allowed by the SEC?”  Fifty of the 56 responded “no.”  
Six didn’t respond to the question.  Additionally, several who responded “no” added comments, 
which did not hint at alternatives to the external audit.  Typical comments were:  
“Sarbanes-Oxley Act will cause companies and auditors to re-engineer
auditing outputs.”
“There is likely to be attention to innovative strategies with higher level
of effectiveness relative to fraud discovery.”
9.  IMPACT OF SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
As noted previously, three additional questions that were added to the 2004 survey related to 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act implementation.  The first additional question was:
“What is your assessment of the impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act at this point
(Check as many as apply)?” 
 
In Table 6, the alternatives listed are shown in the order in which they were presented following 
the above question.  Note that while 30.4 percent believe that the new requirements will enhance 
the credibility of the auditor’s report, there were 69.6 percent who didn’t think there would be 
much difference in the credibility of the auditor’s report.  
Also, while 25.0 percent thought the cost of additional requirements “is justified,” there were 
71.4 percent who thought the cost of additional requirements “is not justified.”
Impact of Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
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Table 6
ASSESSMENT OF IMPACT OF SARBANES-OXLEY ACT
(N = 56)*
Opinion Frequency Percentage
1.  We think the new requirements will
enhance credibility of auditor’s report 17 30.4
2.  We don’t think there will be much difference
in credibility of auditor’s report 39 69.6
3.  We think the cost of additional requirements
is justified 14 25.0
4.  We think the cost of additional requirements
is not justified 40 71.4
5.  We think some degree of participating in
rule-setting and regulation should have 
continued to be delegated to the public 8 14.3
6.  We don’t believe there is a problem with
stripping public accounting of all rule-making 
and regulation. 3 5.4
7.  (Other) Please explain: 5 8.9
a.  Sarbanes-Oxley has gone beyond
its initial intention; SOX was intended
to avoid future Enrons and WorldComs, yet
none of the standards would have prevented
an Enron or a WorldCom.  (VP of financial reporting)
b.  Section 404 is complete overkill, counterproductive,
and a drain on corporate America. (Chief Accounting
Officer)
c.  Most rule making should continue by the profession.
(SeniorVP, Internal Audit)
d.  SOX 404 is costly. (Controller)
e.There is some value to 404, but there may be some
overkill in how it is being implemented.  (CFO)
*Respondents were to check as many as apply.
There were eight of the 56 (14.3 percent) who believed that some degree of participation in rule-
setting and regulation should have been continued to be delegated to the public accounting 
profession, while three (5.4 percent) do not see a problem with stripping public accounting of all 
rule-making and regulation.  With the shifting of both rule-making and regulation to the Public 
Company Accounting Oversight Board, there is a question about regulation to the Public Company the
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status of public accounting: Is it technically a “profession?”
Attestation Related to Internal Control
Respondents were asked to make a judgment about the value of the attestation related to internal 
control required under Section 404 of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board 
regulations.  Table 7 provides the responses.  Twenty-five percent of respondents believed the 
requirement is an excellent one.  Another 33.9 percent were “uncertain that this requirement will 
add much value.”  There were 35.7 percent who questioned the value of this requirement.
A number added notes that expressed continuing uncertainty of the ultimate value.
The three who checked, “other,” commented:
a.  “appears to be an excellent requirement, but there may be some overkill
in implementation.”
b.  “believe it will add value, but unsure if costs will exceed value.”
c.  “in the end, enhancement may be excellent, but not likely in early years
of adoption.”
Table 7
Value of Internal Control Attestation
(N = 56)
Opinion of Value Frequency Percentage
An excellent requirement 14 25.0
Uncertain that this requirement will add much value 19 33.9
We question the value of this requirement 20 35.7
Other (Uncertainty conveyed by the three) 3 5.4
Total 56 100.0
The Cost of An Audit
The overwhelming majority of respondents indicated that the cost of the next external audit 
would be higher because of the introduction of an attestation examination, which is equivalent to 
an audit and results in the expression of an opinion by the external audits.  Only two of the 56 
respondents noted that they thought the cost will be essentially the same as in the prior year.  
(Responses were provided in the summer of 2004, so for most entities the next audit was likely 
to be year end of 2004.)
Some Summary Comments 
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The 54 respondents who felt the costs would be higher estimated increases that ranged from no 
more than 10 percent to over 50 percent higher.  The estimates are provided in Table 8. While 
42.6 percent estimated that costs would be no more than 20 percent higher, there were another 
42.6 percent who estimated costs would be between 31 percent and somewhere over 50 percent.  
Table 8
Additional Cost for Next External Audit
(N = 54)
Estimated Additional Cost Frequency Percentage
Not more than 10 percent 9 16.7
Between 11 and 20 percent 14 25.9
Between 21 and 30 percent 8 14.8
Between 31 and 40 percent            12 22.2
Between 41 and 50 percent 8 14.8
Over 50 percent 3 5.6
Total 54 100.0 
A number of additional comments were made relative to their estimates.  Illustrative comments 
included:
“Our audit will be about 5 percent higher, but that doesn’t include what is now
required by Sarbanes-Oxley.”
“If we include requirements for 404, our audit will be 60 percent higher than last 
year.”
“The new internal control audit will add 60 percent to our costs.”
10.  SOME SUMMARY COMMENTS
In a general, overall review of the survey of 1984 and that of 2004, the simple conclusion is that 
there is a strong, persisting belief that an external audit is a positive engagement.  While there 
were some differences, there were amazing similarities.
The Audit Continues to Be Considered to Have Value
Notwithstanding the recent spotlight on external audits, there were no recommendations for 
alternatives to the annual audit.  As noted earlier, the level of response or the nature of response 
in 2004 did not match that in the 1984 survey.  Has the turmoil in auditing over the years since 
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Enron shifted attention to dealing with new regulations and away from the reflection of value 
noted, for example, in unsolicited letters received in response to the 1984 survey?  Or, has the 
letter been replaced by emails and a letter is not a natural response to a questionnaire?
The Uncertainty of the Value of PCAOB Rules and Regulations
The added questions elicited responses that are not different from comments in the business press 
about the implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.  While there are strong supporters 
for the value of the new structure and the consolidation of rule-making for auditing and oversight 
in the PCAOB, it is not yet clear what opinions will be after some experience with 
implementation of new rulings, especially those related to attestation of internal control.  The 
overwhelming conclusion from the responses in this 2004 survey is uncertainty – hesitation – to 
predict success.  
Illustrative of Comments From the Final Months of 2004 Follow:  
Jenkins, in his column in The Wall Street Journal, “Thinking Outside the Sarbox,” reflected 
skepticism that the problems in the auditing scandals are being resolved in the implementation:
Nor does any legislative solution for the inherent risks and foibles of market 
capitalism suggest itself.
Better ideas are bouncing around on how to make the audit play a decent and 
useful role, usually by releasing companies from the peculiar role of paying 
someone to say nice things about them.  Auditors might be sent to work for the 
SEC, which was responsible to uncover fraud.  Or auditors could be hired by the 
stock exchanges, which might take on greater duty to insure that listed companies 
are on the up and up.
McDonnell, who is the former vice-chairman of business assurance at Coopers and Lybrand and 
partner and global director of assurance services at PricewaterhouseCoopers, commented:
The objective of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 was to make registrant audit
committees, corporate management and the auditing profession work together to 
mitigate the risk of catastrophic auditing failures.  But as an experienced auditor, I 
fear the current business and regulatory environment may hinder achieving that 
objective.  
If audit firms are to survive, the PCAOB must adopt a broader, more effective
approach to oversight.  Auditors therefore must persuade the PCAOB of the need 
to adopt a strategy that anticipates and prevents audit failures.
The U. S. Treasury Secretary, John Snow, pleaded for balance in the enforcing of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Law.  His opinions, noted in a New York Times article, included:
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Some Summary Comments
Mr. Snow said the corporate-accountability law, passed in July 2002 in response to a 
series of corporate scandals, remains ‘absolutely essential’ for maintaining investor
confidence after recent corporate scandals.  He also said he sees no need for ‘major 
modifications’ to the statute.  
He added that the Securities and Exchange Commission, other regulators,…‘need to 
think about’ business leaders’ perception that the regulatory system ‘is not in as good 
balance as it should be,’ he said.  
The article also noted that Donaldson, the chairman of the SEC, acknowledged the costs and 
criticisms of Sarbanes-Oxley and announced the creation of an advisory committee to examine 
its [the 2002 Act] impact on smaller public companies.  Donaldson said the SEC had no plans for 
now to study the effects of Sarbanes-Oxley on larger companies.
A Role for the Academic Community
A wise, comprehensive study of the impact of PCAOB would be a worthy effort by academic 
accounting researchers.  The partial views of those in the field, reporters, politicians, heads of 
agencies, and others are not adequate.  To date, there appears to have been limited assessment of 
why the scandals occurred or why the auditors were not sufficiently diligent in meeting 
anticipated level of professional behavior.  
Among the questions that need serious exploration are:
1.  Is there impairment of professional behavior by practitioners as the field 
of public accounting may no longer technically meet the criteria for professional status?
The use of “industry” instead of “profession” in referring to public accounting by 
careful writers/ speakers appears not to have been internalized, so that there 
continues to be reference to “profession” by firm leaders and writers in such 
publications as The Journal of Accountancy and the CPA Journals.
2.  What are the reasons for the failure of publicly-owned companies to heed the
statutory requirements for an adequate system of internal control?
With the passage of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, there was an 
amendment to the Securities Act of 1934 that required internal control. Yet, 27 
years later, there are many publicly-owned companies who are encountering 
difficulty in preparing for an attestation of internal control as required under 
Section 404.
3.  What are the strategies accepted by auditors, and their firms, that reduce the
incidence of bowing to the client’s demand that an auditor’s perceived
violation of GAAP must be accepted? 
4.  What are the ongoing measures of assessment of an auditor’s work- in-progress
Value of an External Audit Revisited
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that actually reduce detection risk?
5.  What are innovative strategies for the performance of an audit that provide a
high probability of fraud detection?
6.  What are the skills and knowledge of auditors who have an exceptional ability
to identify fraud possibilities and to access such possibilities effectively?
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APPENDIX
Letter to CEO
Questionnaire:  Value of the External Audit
(Each letter was addressed personally to the CEO of the selected Fortune 500 companies)
Date
Name and Address
Salutation:  Dear Mr. (Ms.)________________
Twenty years ago we did a survey to answer the question:  “Is there no value to an entity’s worth 
as a result of the external audit?”
Our question at that time was motivated by what a partner in a major public accounting firm had stated at 
an accounting convention on April 30, 1984.  His comment was:  “The audit by external auditors adds no 
value to an entity’s worth.”
Twenty years ago we sought cooperation of approximately 300 public companies, selected at random 
from the Fortune 500 companies.  We had approximately a 40 percent return from our anonymous 
survey.  The results were informative and a number of respondents added letters with additional details.  
We are repeating that investigative survey of two decades ago.  As you know well, auditors are 
functioning in a different environment.  The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 as implemented by the PCAOB 
introduces requirements that change both the tasks of the reporting entity and of the external auditor.  
 We seek your cooperation in getting a candid, straight-forward assessment of the external audit.  
Would you forward the enclosed questionnaire to one of your staff, who can best report the 
opinion of your top executive group on this matter. 
In addition to using the same questions that we used in July 1984, we have added four questions.  Any 
other comments are welcomed, especially any of your perceptions of the impact of the role of the new 
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board.  If you prefer, we would be happy to arrange a telephone 
conversation.  If by telephone, no identification of the respondent or the company represented will be 
necessary.    
This request is being sent to a random sample of U. S. major companies.  We shall be grateful for your 
cooperation.
Sincerely yours
B. H. Newman
Department of Accounting
Lubin School of Business bnewman@pace.edu
M. E. Oliverio
Department of Accounting
Lubin School of Business  moliverio@pace.edu
Enclosure:  Questionnaire
Value of the External Audit
We seek an assessment of the contribution of external auditors.  Candid, straight-forward 
responses will be appreciated.
1.  Would you have an annual audit by a public accounting firm if it were not required by the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934?
_______No  (if you check this line, the next question is 2)
_______Yes (if you check this line, the next question is 3)
2.  If no, why not?
_______we don’t believe the credibility provided by the outside audit is needed
 by users of our financial statements.
_______we think our internal auditors provide us with sufficient financial audits.
_______other (please explain)______________________________
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
3.  If yes, why?  (Please check just one, which is most important)
________We believe that an external audit is required for credibility of our financial 
  statements.
________Our banks require external audits.
________An external audit imposes discipline on our entire financial statements.
________An external audit encourages our adherence to GAAP.
________An external audit results in valuable recommendations for our total operations.
________An external audit helps us maintain high quality among our internal audit staff.
________An external audit encourages us to improve our accounting information system.
________(Other)  Please specify:____________________________
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
4.  As you consider the quality of your external auditing staff (for the last fiscal year audit)
in relation to that of your internal audit staff, what is your assessment?
_______The two staffs are approximately of the same quality, we believe.
_______We would judge the external auditors to be of higher quality than our staff.
_______We would judge our internal auditors to be of higher quality than the
 external audit staff.
5.  For the last annual audit, how much time did your internal audit staff devote to assisting
the external auditors?
_______Zero percent
_______Some time, but no more than 10 percent of the staff’s time during the period of 
 the audit.
_______Between 11 percent and 20 percent of the staff’s time during the period of the
 audit.
_______(Other) Please specify:
6.  Is there an alternative to the annual audit by an outside accounting firm that you think should
be allowed by the SEC?
ADDED QUESTIONS:
1. What is your assessment of the impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act at this point?
(Check as many as apply)
_______we think the new requirements will enhance the credibility of the
auditor’s report.
________we don’t think there will be much difference in the credibility of the
report.
________we think the cost of additional requirements is justified.
________we think the cost of additional requirements is not justified.  
________we believe some degree of participation in rule setting and regulation
should have been continued to be delegated to the public
accounting profession.
________we don’t believe there is a problem with stripping public accounting
of all rule making and regulation. 
________(Other) Please explain:
2.  What is your current judgment about the value of the attestation related to internal
control?
________an excellent requirement.
________uncertain that this requirement will add much value.
________we question the value of this requirement.
________(Other)  Please explain:
3.  As you think of your next annual external audit, what is your current judgment
about what this audit will cost?
________we think the cost will be essentially the same as the prior year’s.
________we think the cost will be higher by (please insert)______percent. 
________we think the cost will be lower by (please insert) ______percent.
________(Other)  Please explain:
4.  Any other comments about your assessment of what is provided by your
external auditor?
The title of the person filling in this questionnaire is:___________________________
The title of the person to whom the above person reports is: ____________________
Thank you for responding to this questionnaire.  Please return in the enclosed envelope to:
           (by July 23, if possible)
B. H. Newman and Mary Ellen Oliverio
Pace University
Pace Plaza 212-346-1815 (bhn)
New York, NY  10038 212-346-1819 (meo) 

